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NOTES
AT THE BORDER OF REASONABLENESS:
SEARCHES BY CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
Border searches1 are as old as this country2 but as new as their
methods.3 Customs agents are empowered by statute4 to search on sus-
picion for contraband imported "by the person in possession or.. . by,
in, or upon [any] vehicle or beast, or otherwise .... ." The statute does
not expressly include searches for contraband introduced in people; but
as modem technology and imagination have produced smugglers who
transport contraband in themselves, customs officials have devised
methods to combat such endeavors. The statute also distinguishes be-
1 'Border search" is a term of art used "to distingtiish official se Lrches Which are
reasonable because inade solely in the ehforcemeni of Customs laws ftom other official
searches made in connection with general law enforcement." Alexander V. United States,
362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 885 U.S. 977 (1966). Although no. court has
mentioiied it, the distinction often ndd not be made; Many border searches result from
tips, and the Supreme Court has held that an informer's tip ean constitute probable
cause if buttressed by the informer's previous reliability and the happening of at least
some of the predicted events. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1959).
2 See Act of July 31, 1789, th. 5, § 28, 1 Stat. 49. the section permits inspectors to
search on suspicion. The fact that it was passed with celerity by the same Congress that
drafted the fourth amendment has been cited by the Supreme Court as a basis for the
privileged position of border searches. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925);
Boyd v. United States, 116 t.s. 6i6, 6 8 (1886). This view, however, has been reasbnably
criticized on the ground that searches of ships and buildings, and not physically intrusive
searches, were the matters contemplated by the First Congress. Note, Intrusive Border
Sdarches-Is Judicial Control Desirable?, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 276, 278 (1966).
3 See, e.g., Blefare v. United Statek, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) (rectal probe, effietic
poured through tube forced through nose and throat into stomach); Denton v. United
States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962) (rectal txkmination inder sedative).
4 [A]ny of the officers or persons authorized . . . to board or search vessels may
stop, search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts,
any vehicle, beastj or person on which or whom he or they shall suspect there
are goods, wares, of indrcaridise which ard subject to duty or shall have been
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by
the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or
otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may
have a reasonable cause to suspect there are goods which were imported contrary
to law; and if any such 6ffider or other person go iuthorized . . . shall find any
goods, wares, or merchandise, on ot about any stich vehicle, beast, or person, or
in any §uch trunk or envelope, which he shall have reasonable cause to believe
are subject to duty; or to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States,
whether by the persdn in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle,
beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure thi same for tria....
Smuggling Act § 8, 14 Stat. 178 (1866), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964). See also Tariff Act of 1930,
§§ 581-82, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1581-82 (1964).
5 Smuggling Act § 8, 14 Stat. 178 (1866), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) (emphasis added).
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tween searches of people, vehicles, and beasts, which may be triggered
by suspicion, and searches of trunks and envelopes, for which "reason-
able cause to suspect" is required.6 The theory behind providing less
protection for people than for packages apparently is that trained
customs agents can detect telling signs of nervousness in travelers that
arouse suspicion not amounting to probable cause.7
The statute has had frequent application by lower federal courts.
Evidence obtained during border searches !has generally been admitted,
even though officials forcefully invaded the body of the suspect, s con-
ducted the search far from the border,9 or searched automobiles driven
by persons who never left the country.10 Persons injured during a
border search are generally without any remedy.1" Despite these obvious
problems and the lack of any discernible limitations on border searches,
the Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari on the question.12
In dictum, however, the Court has recognized the unique nature of a
border search:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding
liquor .... Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an interna-
tional boundary because of national self protection reasonably re-
quiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to
come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully
brought in.13
6 Id. Most courts have interpreted "reasonable cause to suspect" to mean probable
cause, cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 n.3 (1959), though the phrase has not
been interpreted in the context of this particular statute.
For the statute to apply, package searches must be "in the course of entry." Corngold
v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1966). In the interior, a warrant will be required
for search of a package, id., unless it is impractical to require one. Romero v. United
States, 318 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
7 See Note, supra note 2, at 279.
8 E.g., Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
9 E.g., Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1959) (75 miles from border).
10 E.g., Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967).
11 See pp. 880-81 infra.
12 E.g., Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977
(1966); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 936
(1964); Bible v. United States, 314 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 862 (1963);
Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); Murgia v.
United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961); King v. United
States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859 U.S. 939. (1959); Blackford v. United
States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
13 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925). The case involved bootlegged
liquor and held that an automobile could be searched without a warrant if there was
probable cause for the search, even though the search was not incident to a valid arreit.
Accord, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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The Ninth Circuit, however, has attempted to fit border searches into
the traditional constitutional pattern, holding that in border search
cases there is "probable cause to search every person ... by reason of
... entry alone."'
4
Should the Supreme Court decide to grant certiorari in a border
search case, it will have to strike a balance between the rights of the
individual crossing the border and the governmental interest in pro-
tecting the integrity of that border. The following border search ques-
tions must be resolved against the background of the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against unreasonable searches,15 which extends to
both the initiation of a search'6 and the method employed.' How far
into the interior may a search take place and still be a border search?
Must a person actually cross the border? Do customs officials enjoy a
wider range of search methods than ordinary law enforcement officials?
I
PROBLEMS OF BORDER SEARCHES
A. "Completed Entry"
The same Supreme Court dictum that authorized border searches'
also limited them, requiring reinstatement of the normal standard of
probable cause once a person has lawfully entered the country.'9
14 Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961)
(emphasis added).
15 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause .... " U.S. CONSr. amend. IV.
16 Under the fourth amendment a search with a warrant is dearly reasonable. McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 814 (1967) (dissenting opinion). The Supreme Court has defined
probable cause as "a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer," that a crime is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
Using this definition, the Court has said that, when there is probable cause to arrest, a
warrantless search can be made incident to the arrest to prevent destruction of evidence.
Preston v. United States, 876 U.S. 364, 867 (1964). This might be an alternative ground for
supporting border searches conducted by means of a stomach pump. A smuggler swallows
a balloon full of heroin in Mexico, expecting to regurgitate it on the American side of
border. If the balloon remains in the smuggler's stomach for very long, stomach acid will
destroy the balloon, liberating a fatal overdose of heroin into the smuggler's system and,
incidentally, destroying the evidence. See Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 885-86
(9th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
17 The distinction is not new. See Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 749-50
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 856 U.S. 914 (1958). See also Note, Search and Seizure at the
Border-The Border Search, 21 RtrrEa.s L. Rxv., 518, 516 (1967).
18 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 182, 153-54 (1925).
19 But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways,
1968]
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Personal freedom from unreasonable search, however, often conflicts
with the government's right to pursue contraband.20 Modem smuggling
methods often force searchers to interfere with personal rights in order
to enforce laws prohibiting possession of contraband.21 The task, there-
fore, is to determine when "entry" is complete, and thus when personal
freedom from unreasonable search overcomes the government's interest
in choking off traffic in contraband.
For example, in United States v. Yee Ngee How,22 the defendant,
who had been searched while aboard ship, was searched again at the
end of the pier, this time with incriminating results. Admitting the
evidence, the court speculated: "Had the petitioner or his possessions
been searched while he was off the ship and within the city, the situa-
tion would have been different.. .- 3 In Cervantes v. United States,24
the government did not even attempt to maintain that a search seventy
miles from the border was a border search. Finding completed entry
and no probable cause for the search, the court reversed the conviction
based on evidence obtained in the illegal search.25
have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known
to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that
their vehicles are carrying contraband ....
Id. at 154 (dictum) (emphasis added).
20 [I]n the case of excisable or dutiable articles, the government has an interest
in them for the payment of the duties thereon, and until such duties are paid has
a right to keep them under observation, or to pursue and drag them from con-
cealment ....
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886) (dictum).
21 E.g., INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4721-24 (failure to pay tax on narcotics unlawful).
22 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
23 Id. at 523 (dictum). See also Landau v. United States Att'y, 82 F.2d 285, 286 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665 (1936).
24 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959).
25 After a second trial and second conviction, the case was ordered dismissed for
lack of probable cause for the arrest. Cervantes v. United States, 278 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.
1960). Other Ninth Circuit cases the next year found searches at a distance from the
border to be non-border searches. Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961)
(probable cause needed at checkpoint 72 miles from border); Plazola v. United States, 291
F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) (50 miles). "The search did not purport to be, nor was it, a border
search." Id. at 63. See also United States v. Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. Cal. 1959), in
which, at a checkpoint an unspecified distance between the Mexican border and Los
Angeles, officers jointly employed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Bureau of Customs started to inspect defendant's car, ostensibly in a search for aliens
under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a),(c) (1964).
During the search, marijuana was found in a package of cigarettes. The court refused
to admit the evidence, saying, "when Inspector Hanks opened the Salem cigarette
package, he did not expect to find an alien." 179 F. Supp. at 917. The court went on to
say that inspectors lacking a warrant or probable cause must not be permitted to delay
travel "to an extent not necessary for the conduct of a bona fide search for aliens ....
Id. at 918.
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The distinction between border search cases triggered by mere
suspicion and completed entry cases in which probable cause is re-
quired was clouded by the Fifth Circuit in Marsh v. United States,.
2 6
The court refused to admit in evidence narcotics seized sixty-three
miles from the border by a constable who searched in response to a
radio message from customs agents at the border. In dictum, the court
stated:
The right of border search is indeed broad, and the border
itself is elastic. Judged by Texas standards, sixty-three miles is a
small distance, and if the Customs agents had any reason, even
though not ordinarily measuring up to "probable cause," it might,
under all of the circumstances, suffice to meet the constitutional
test of reasonableness and amount to "probable cause."27
The description is of a hybrid search, not quite a border search because
mere suspicion is insufficient,2 8 yet not quite a completed entry because
probable cause is not required. Nothing more has been said about
hybrid searches, and there is little support for the court's approval of
a "border search" in the interior based on a request relayed from the
border.
29
In Alexander v. United States,30 the Ninth Circuit set forth an
extremely elastic test of the legality of searches after entry:
[T]he legality of the search must be tested by a determination
whether the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including
the time and distance elapsed as well as the manner and extent of
surveillance, are such as to convince the fact finder with reasonable
certainty that any contrabrand which might be found . . .was
aboard the vehicle at the time of entry .... 31
By this test, a customs agent could conceivably spend months
26 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965).
27 Id. at 324 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). The court found no proof in
the record of knowledge on the part of the telephoning customs agent. In the only
similar Fifth Circuit case the search was upheld. Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1959) (75 miles).
28 At the border "'unsupported' or 'mere' suspicion alone is sufficient to justify such
a search for purposes of Customs law enforcement." Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d
379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
29 See Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d 124, 131 (9th Cir. 1963) (concurring opinion):
"It would be unduly restrictive of the idea of pursuit to require that the officers pursue
the car in person." However, since an unwatched suspect could have picked up contra-
band between the border crossing and the search, the concept of "pursuit by radio"
clashes with the surveillance aspect of the test for admissibility suggested in Alexander
v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.).
30 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
31 Id. at 382.
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following a person hundreds of miles from the border, and still con-
duct a border search, because he may be able to convince the fact-finder
that the contraband was aboard when the vehicle crossed the border.3 2
As a result, a search in Iowa might legitimately be conducted on mere
suspicion. The prevailing Alexander test thus destroys the concept of
completed entry and subordinates the personal rights of individuals to
the government's right to seize contraband.
B. Informers, Entrapment, and the "Never Leaving" Problem
Although border searches can be made on mere suspicion,33 most
appellate cases result from tip-initiated arrests.34 The identity of the
informer in the interior may be relevant to the separate issues of
probable cause and guilt.3 5 Since probable cause is not required at the
border, the source of an inspector's suspicion is irrelevant. On the guilt-
related question of entrapment, however, the informer's identity should
be as relevant at the border as it is in the interior. If a paid informer
makes the crime possible, a defense of entrapment is made out.36
In Lannom v. United States,37 for example, customs agents re-
ceived a tip that a car loaded with marijuana would be driven across
the border and parked behind a laundromat, to be driven away later
by another person. The predicted events occurred and the second driver
was arrested after a search revealed the contraband. At trial the de-
fendant demanded the identity of the informer, on the ground that if
the informer were the first driver, there was an entrapment. The court
found no tangible evidence that the informer's identity would be help-
ful to the defense. The dissent argued that the government should be
required to prove that it did not, through its own agents, accomplish
the illegal importation.38 The dissenter's solution seems more desirable,
since it preserves entrapment as a viable defense.
Searching for contraband is markedly different from using police
32 For an application of the test, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378
F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967) (constant surveillance until search some 15 hours and 20 miles
after border crossing).
33 Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977
(1966).
34 A survey of the appellate cases arising from border searches reveals that at least
60% of the arrests are instigated by tips from informers.
35 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
36 See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435 (1932).
37 381 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1968). See also Ruiz v.
United States, 380 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1967); Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d
256 (9th Cir. 1967).
38 381 F.2d at 862-63 (dissenting opinion).
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machinery to capture a suspected criminal. The aim of the border
search is primarily to eliminate traffic in contraband and only sec-
ondarily to arrest the smuggler. In Lannom, however, customs agents
knowingly allowed the car to pass through their station and maintained
surveillance, permitting the immediate trafficker to escape, not in order
to capture the contraband, but solely to arrest a higher-up. Since the
statute does not limit the border search to the automobile, a person
who never crosses the border but who either knowingly or innocently
steps into the marked car is himself subject to an intrusive border
search. This might occur if the second driver in the Lannom situation
brushed his hand in front of his mouth moments after entering the car.
This delayed-action border search seems a perversion of purpose to
satisfy the ends of law enforcement officials.
C. Body Searches
Border officials enjoy a much wider latitude in deciding whether
to search than law enforcement officials in the interior. Apparently
they are also accorded broader leeway in searching the body of a sus-
pected smuggler.
1. Reasonableness in the Interior
The standards of reasonableness of body searches by ordinary law
enforcement officials can be gleaned from a comparison of two leading
cases. In Rochin v. California,39 a shocked Supreme Court reversed a
narcotics conviction based on evidence obtained when the police broke
into the defendant's bedroom, assaulted him, and forcibly pumped his
stomach to obtain the capsules he had swallowed to avoid detection. 40
In Schmerber v. California,4 1 the Court upheld the admission of blood
tests taken over the defendant's objection "by a physician in a hospital
environment according to accepted medical practices."42 Invasions of
89 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
40 [We are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction
was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that
shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of
his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods
too dose to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
Id. at 172.
41 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Rochin was decided prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), which applied the fourth amendment to the states. Schmerber was thus the first
fourth amendment intrusive search case decided by the Court, although the Court pre-
sumably could have considered intrusive non-border searches by federal officials, previously.
42 384 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added).
1968]
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the body are not per se unconstitutional; only improperly conducted
searches violate a suspect's rights. The Court, however, carefully warned
against a broad reading of its opinion in Schmerber, saying that it "in
no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions ....
2. Reasonableness at the Border
In contrast to the holding in Rochin and the warning in Schmerber,
no border search has been found unreasonable, despite physical abuse,
44
stomach pumping,45 rectal searches, 46 and even injection of sedative.
4
7
In Alexander v. United States,48 the Ninth Circuit suggested that
there is a separate test of reasonableness for border searches; but the
case involved a nonintrusive search, and no distinction was made be-
tween reasonable initiation and reasonable method of search. The
court said in dictum:
In conferring upon Customs officers such broad authority,
circumscribed only by Constitutional limitations of the Fourth
Amendment, the Congress has in effect declared that a search
which would be "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, if conducted by police officers in the ordinary case,
would be a reasonable search if conducted by Customs officials in
lawful pursuit of unlawful imports.4 9
Although this language can be interpreted broadly, the factual context
suggests that the court intended to describe the reasonableness of initiat-
ing the search, not the reasonableness of the methods employed. In a
subsequent Ninth Circuit case, Blefare v. United States,50 where the
reasonableness of the method was directly in issue, Alexander was not
even cited,
In Blefare defendants were convicted of smuggling heroin into the
43 Id. at 772.
44 E.g., Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966); Denton v. United States,
310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Barrera v. United States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1960); King
v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959); Blackford
v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
45 Whether the stomach is actually "pumped" has turned into a nice semantic
question. See Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 879 n.3 (9th Cir. 1966). The pro-
cedure was also upheld in Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir, 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 862 (1964); Barrera v. United States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th Gir. 1960); King v.
United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959).
46 E.g., Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966); Denton v. United
States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
4T Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962).
48 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denidd, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
49 Id. at 381.
50 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
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United States in their stomachs. They were detained and disrobed at
the custom house and then taken twelve miles to the office of a previ-
ously alerted doctor. After an unsuccessful rectal probe, a solution to
induce vomiting was administered. Still unsuccessful, the customs
agents physically restrained Blefare while a tube was forced through
his nose and throat and into his stomach. Packets of heroin were recov-
ered in the regurgitation. The court held the search reasonable in
light of the lack of substantial pain,51 the fact that the defendant would
have had to make himself regurgitate anyway,52 and the lack of
viable alternative procedures. The court cited border search cases
approving both rectal and emetic searches, noting that "[s]ome knowl-
edge of the presence of the narcotics in the stomach of the suspect is
necessary. '53 Blefare's previous discussions with Canadian police and
needle marks on his arms supplied a "strong presumption." The court
felt it necessary, however, to distinguish Rochin on the grounds that
the police in Rochin were guilty of wrongful entry and use of excessive
force. Also, the internal importation of narcotics and judicial dismissal
of charges against Blefare, the court felt, would be more shocking to the
average citizen than the police behavior involved. Thus, the shock-
the-conscience test, born to measure the conduct of police, was used in
Blefare to judge the behavior of defendants in determining admissibil-
ity of evidence against them. That the court took time to distinguish
Rochin indicates that it felt at least some doubt that a separate test
exists at the border for reasonableness of method.
The policy dilemma present in all border search cases was clearly
presented in Blackford v. United States. 4 There customs agents con-
ducted a forced rectal examination that yielded smuggled heroin. The
majority stressed the evils of illicit drug traffic and discussed the alter-
natives to allowing the search. The defendant might procure a writ
of habeas corpus and later remove the narcotics himself; he might
recover the narcotics in jail; or the police might have to sift through
mounds of excrement. Stating by way of dictum that a border search
can be unreasonably executed but still constitutionally acceptable if
not shocking, the Blackford court found the search reasonable accord-
ing to the following tests: knowledge, sanitary and scientific nature of
the search, presence of a doctor, and absence of force. The dissent be-
lieved that the grant of power to customs agents was excessive, "fraught
51 Id. at 872 n.1.
52 Id. at 873 n.3.
53 Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
54 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
1968]
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with almost certain abuse," and "on its face... within the interdiction
of the Fourth Amendment. '5
5
Authorizing intrusive border searches on mere suspicion as long
as the methods are not shocking means giving customs agents the power
to follow a suspect for long periods of time and then pump his stomach
and search his rectum after injecting him with a sedative or physically
restraining him with the degree of force necessary to carry out the
search. Prohibiting such searches could mean an alarming increase in
the amount of narcotics that crosses the border within'body cavities.56
Is there any middle ground? And, perhaps more important, is there any




A. Protecting Innocent and Guilty Alike
Border search cases arise on motions to suppress evidence. In each
case incriminating evidence has been found; and in each case the
question is, was it found according to the rules of the game? One
Supreme Court Justice has suggested that for every broken rule exposed
and conviction reversed there are many illegal searches that yield no
incriminating results and thus never come before the courts.57 Blefare-
type searches may interfere with innocent individuals as well as
smugglers.
The innocent traveler injured by overzealous customs officials
apparently has no civil remedy. In Klein v. United States,55 the plaintiff
sought damages for physical and mental harm resulting from negligent
detention and search. Although the complaint sounded in negligence,
55 Id. at 755 (dissenting opinion).
56 In 1960 the Ninth Circuit took judicial notice of the fact that 18-20% of all heroin
traffic on the Mexican-United States border in California is concealed in body cavities.
Murgia v. United States, 285 FR2d 14, 15 n.1 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977
(1961).
57 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In
one case a rectal search was made without success. No court would have heard of the
search if the suspect had not also been the defendant in Blefare v. United States, 362
F.2d 870, 871 (9th Cir. 1966), where an emetic search five weeks later proved fruitful. A
similar case nearly escaped judicial notice when the defendant accepted an emetic and
regurgitated a few times without vomiting any packets of heroin. The customs agents
decided that the suspect was indeed innocent, but while being driven back to his car he
vomited again, this time bringing up the heroin. Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 936 (1964).
58 268 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1959).
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the Second Circuit found that the action was actually for battery and
false arrest, exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 9 Although
cases generally involve the rights of the guilty, one must remember that
the Bill of Rights was written to protect the innocent from the arbitrary
use of power. "A rule protective of law-abiding citizens is not apt to
flourish where its advocates are usually criminals. Yet the rule we
fashion is for the innocent and guilty alike."
60
B. A Solution Rejected: The Health Warrant
In Camara v. Municipal Court,6 the Supreme Court faced a prob-
lem similar to that arising in border search cases. After holding that
health department searches made without a warrant were "significant
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment," 62
the Court had tb find a way to interpose a magistrate without unduly
restricting the health inspector, whose function has a "unique char-
acter." The Court settled on a definition of probable cause that takes
into account "the nature of the search." 63 For health inspections, prob-
able cause need not relate to a particular building, but rather can be
satisfied by a showing of the legitimacy of the inspector's undertaking.
On its face, this "synthetic search warrant" 64 is an appealing solu-
tion to the border search cases as well. In both situations traditional
judicial acceptance and strong policy grounds have promoted the
searches. But an important factor in Camara was that health inspections
are normally less intrusive than police searches; many border searches,
on the other hand, are more intrusive.
The Camara warrant requires too little to make it useful in the
border search situation. If a customs officer need only state a legitimate
purpose to get a warrant, the warrant would not offer any significant
protection against searches. The only barrier to forcing a tube through
a suspect's nose would be the requirement that the agent give his word
that he really is searching for narcotics.
59 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1964). Since customs agents are federal officers, the injured
party would have no claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964),
which pertains only to deprivations of rights by state officials under color of law. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. District of S. Mo. Comm'rs, 258 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Mo.), appeal vacated as
moot, 368 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1966).
60 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
62 Id. at 534.
63 Id. at 538, quoting with approval the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959).




C. A Possible Answer
The problems are highlighted by the following series of hypothet-
ical situations:
(1) An anonymous informant notifies customs agents that a
particularly described person will attempt to cross the border carrying
narcotics in his rectum. An exterior investigation of the undressed
suspect shows no external evidence to verify the tip.
(2) Same as (1), except external verification is present.
(3) Same as (1), except the tip is that the suspect will be carrying
narcotics in his stomach, making external evidence impossible to ob-
tain.
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(4) Same as (1), except the informer is known to be reliable.
(5) Same as (2), except the informer is known to be reliable.
(6) Same as (3), except the informer is known to be reliable.
Under present law, an intrusive search is authorized on mere sus-
picion, and the suspect could be searched immediately in all cases.
Under the Camara warrant, the customs agent would be allowed to
search the suspect in all cases as soon as he presents himself before a
magistrate, announces his purpose, and obtains a warrant. Under Su-
preme Court holdings in informer cases in the interior,66 searches (4),
(5), and (6) would be authorized without a warrant as soon as the infor-
mation supplied by the informer is partially verified by the occurrence
of the predicted series of events; a fortiori these searches would be con-
stitutionally acceptable at the border. And search (2) would be legiti-
mate, since the information supplied by an informant was verified not
only by the happening of a predicted event, but also by the independent
appearance of probable cause. 67 The problem, then, is with searches
(1) and (3), and the issues are the familiar ones of reasonableness of
the initiation and reasonableness of method.
On the problem of reasonable initiation of search, the Supreme
65 A fluoroscope can detect the presence of foreign objects in the stomach, but a
distasteful barium solution must be drunk before the technique works. To administer
the barium to an uncooperative suspect would involve the same procedure as administering
an emetic. Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1966).
66 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Draper v. United States, 558 U.S. 307
(1959).
67 In Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965), an informer of
unknown reliability gave customs agents a tip. A 30-man team watched 14 Chinese parade
relentlessly from the ship on which they worked to defendant's apartment where they
stayed briefly before returning to the ship. Finally, two of the Chinese were pulled from
the parade and, at the request of officers, they removed packets of opium being smuggled
rectally. This provided probable cause for a search of defendant's apartment.
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Court has set forth different tests in two non-border search cases. In
Camara the Court said:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a
general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment, the question is not whether the public interest justifies the
type of search in question, but whether the authority to search
should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part
upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frus-
trate the governmental purpose behind the search. 8
Applied to border searches, the concern is not with either the quantity
of narcotics crossing the border or even the integrity of the country's
borders. Rather, the pragmatic concern of the Court is with balancing
the need for the warrant against the possible frustration of purpose by
requiring one. The only possible frustration would result from destruc-
tion of the evidence-and death of the suspect-if the container in his
stomach leaked or was destroyed by stomach acid. The problem could
be obviated by explaining this possibility to the suspect before detain-
ing him for a reasonable time. In Schmerber, where the potential for
such frustration was noted by the Court, another element was added:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these funda-
mental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that
such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.69
Obviously some degree of certainty is required before a man's body is
invaded. Even in Blefare the Ninth Circuit noted that "[s]ome knowl-
edge... is necessary." 70 Unless the Supreme Court is willing to allow
a different standard of reasonableness in initiating an intrusive search
merely because it is at the border, the language in Schmerber would
seem to indicate that searches (1) and (3), intrusive searches without
probable cause, would not be allowed. But this is not in accord with a
literal reading of the statute,71 especially as interpreted by the Ninth
Circuit in Alexander, where "'unsupported' or 'mere' suspicion alone"
was held "sufficient to justify such a search for purposes of Customs law
enforcement." 72 Under Alexander, the basis for the requisite mere
68 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (emphasis added).
69 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (emphasis added).
70 Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1966).
II Smuggling Act § 3, 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964), quoted in note 4 supra.
72 Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9t0 Cir.), cert..denied, 385 U.$. 977
(1966). Judge Ely, dissenting in Blefare, worried about the consequences of allowing both
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suspicion could be found in the anonymous tip. But this clashes with
the traditional notions of decency and fairness that have guided the
Court, and is opposed to the theory behind our accusatory system.73
Without probable cause, intrusive searches like searches (1) and (3)
should not be allowed, and their fruits should be held inadmissible on
the ground that the inspector lacked the requisite "clear indication."
But what of the rationale that an experienced customs inspector
can somehow detect signs of nervousness in a person crossing the border
carrying contraband? These signs do not constitute probable cause, but
may give rise to a suspicion on the part of customs agents that justifies
a search stopping short of invasion of the body. At issue is a balance,
not between the rights of the individual and destruction of the evidence
as in Schmerber, but rather between the right of the individual to be
free from an intrusive search and the governmental interest in pre-
venting bodily crevasses from serving as inspection-free sanctuaries for
contraband. While this is a naked policy question, in the case of ner-
vousness, as in searches (1) and (3), "fundamental human interests"
should prevail. But in searches (2), (4), (5), and (6) the right to search
should be upheld. There is little difficulty in implementing this policy
decision.
Should the Court hold the Smuggling Act unconstitutional? Al-
though the statute may be viewed as offending traditional due process
notions, it should be read in light of the state of the art at the time the
first customs enforcement section, allowing search on suspicion, was
passed. Undoubtedly the section's framers had in mind the search of
luggage and clothing. Because the smuggling techniques of today were
unheard of when the statute was drafted, the intrusive search was
neither necessary nor contemplated.
A line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable
searches at the border. Though necessity probably dictates upholding
searches of luggage and clothing and perhaps even forcing a traveler
to undress, a warrant should be obtained for any more intrusive
search. 4 The requirement for the warrant should be similar to that
set forth in Gamara: the search should be shown to fulfill a legitimate
governmental purpose. But something more is needed to justify un-
leashing physical force and potent drugs onto and into the body of a
traveler. Whereas no specific showing of probable cause is required
intrusive searches and the "mere suspicion" rule. See Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d
870, 886 (9th Cir. 1966). (dissenting opinion).
73 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74 This was the suggestion of Judge Ely, dissenting in Blefare v. United States, 862
F.2d 870, 886 (9th Cir. 1966).
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in nonintrusive health inspections, some showing of a "clear indica-
tion" or an objectively reasonable suspicion should be made before
an intrusive search is permitted to proceed. The evidence must con-
vince the magistrate that there is good reason to suspect that contraband
is being smuggled internally, a test clearly less rigorous than that of
probable cause.?5 To effectuate this, a United States Commissioner
should be located in each custom house, and customs officers should be
allowed to detain suspects for a reasonable time, perhaps up to three
hours. A suspect should be advised of the dangers in keeping a con-
tainer of heroin within his stomach or in other body cavities, and he
should be given a chance to consent to-and cooperate with-a
search.76
One other problem exists. By diluting the concept of completed
entry, the courts of appeals have created the possibility that border
searches will be made in any part of the country days after the suspect
has crossed the border. The Alexander criteria for convincing the fact-
finder that the suspect's condition was unchanged from the border until
arrest should be supplemented; provision should be made to restrict
border searches to some specific distance.7 7 This would control arbitrary
activity by customs agents but still allow them the tool of continuous
surveillance to determine if there are conspirators awaiting the arrival
of contraband. As discussed above, the courts should be wary of extend-
ing the right of border search in cases where the suspect himself has
never crossed the border; and the defense of entrapment should be
preserved by compelling the government to demonstrate that in Lan-
nom-type situations it did not accomplish the importation through its
own agents.
In border searches a legitimate governmental interest conflicts
with fundamental personal rights. But by continuing to allow nonin-
trusive searches on mere suspicion and requiring for intrusive searches
a warrant based on something less than probable cause, a balance can
be struck. The innocent can cross the border without fear, and the
guilty without impunity.
Barry A. Reder
75 See note 16 supra.
76 See Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
914 (1958). When a condom of heroin in defendant's rectum burst, he cooperated with
officials.
77 The Immigration and Naturalization Service has defined the "reasonable distance"
from the border within which its searches might be conducted as 100 air miles. 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.1 (1967), defining Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)
(1964).
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